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Abstract
Climate related shocks are among the leading cause of 
production and efficiency losses in smallholder crop and 
livestock production in rural Africa.  Consequently, the 
identification of tools to help manage the risks associated 
with climactic extremities is increasingly considered to be 
among the key pillars of any agenda to enhance agricultural 
growth and welfare in rural Africa.  This paper describes the 
application of a promising innovation in insurance design – 
index-based insurance – that seeks to bring the benefits of 
formal insurance to help manage the weather-related risks 
faced by rural crop and livestock producers in low-income 
countries.  In particular, we highlight the research and 
development agenda of a comprehensive effort to design 
commercially viable index based livestock insurance aimed at 
protecting the pastoral populations of northern Kenya from the 
considerable drought-related livestock mortality risk that they 
face.  Detailing the conditions that make the pastoral economy 
in northern Kenya an ideal candidate for the provision of index-
based insurance products, the paper describes the contract 
design, defines its structure, offers analysis that indicates a 
high likelihood of commercial sustainability among the target 
market and describes the process of implementation leading up 
to the launch of a pilot in Marsabit District of northern Kenya in 
early 2010.
Introduction
Downside-production risk is a considerable constraint to 
agricultural production and development whose impact is 
particularly felt by smallholder farmers and livestock keepers 
whose meager resource base offers them few effective options 
to manage this risk. As is true in most of rural Africa, thin 
markets, poor physical and institutional infrastructure and weak 
access to credit and savings markets compound the problem of 
production risk that poor farmers and livestock keepers face.
Climate extremities are the greatest source of agricultural 
production risk with droughts and floods resulting in total or 
partial crop failures as well as forage and water scarcity that 
reduce livestock productivity and, in severe cases, lead to 
widespread livestock losses (Thornton et al. 2008; Hellmuth 
et al. 2007; IPCC 2007).  Over the past decade or so, natural 
disasters, particularly droughts and floods, have risen sharply 
worldwide with the biggest increase in low-income countries 
whose disaster incidence rose at twice the global rate (Tebaldi 
et al. 2006; IFRCRSC 2004).  In much of rural Africa, where water 
harvesting, irrigation and other similar water management 
methods are under developed and the impacts of climate change 
are expected to be especially pernicious, managing agricultural 
production risk becomes increasingly important (Thornton et al. 
2008; Hellmuth et al. 2007).  
The increasing recognition of the considerable risks faced by 
the smallholder agricultural sector and the non-trivial impact 
of these risks on agricultural growth and rural welfare have 
placed a spotlight on risk and lifted the management of risk 
to a place of priority with regards to interventions to catalyze 
agriculture in rural Africa (World Bank 2005; Barrett et al. 2007a). 
Consequently, the past several years have seen the development 
of innovative interventions for managing weather-related 
agricultural risk. Of these, index-based insurance products 
represent a promising and exciting market-based option for 
managing climate related risks that vulnerable households are 
exposed to. 
The creation of insurance markets for events whose likelihood 
of occurrence can be precisely calculated and associated to a 
well defined index is increasingly being championed as a way 
by which the benefits of insurance can be offered to relatively 
poor and remote populations (World Bank 2005; Barrett et al. 
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2007b; Skees and Collier 2008; Skees et al. 2006; Hellmuth et al. 
2009).  Index-based insurance holds considerable appeal for both 
commercial and development purposes because it allows for 
management of covariate risk – particularly those related with 
weather fluctuations – and avoids the serious adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems that have long plagued conventional 
crop and livestock insurance programs throughout the world.  
This paper underscores the potential of index-based insurance to 
manage weather related risk faced by rural farmers and livestock 
keepers by highlighting a comprehensive effort to catalyze a 
commercial market for index-based livestock insurance (IBLI) 
in Marsabit District of northern Kenya.  This IBLI product has 
many innovative features.  It appears to be the first to develop 
the index insurance product from longitudinal household data 
so as to minimize basis risk in product design.  It is one of the 
first developed to protect the productive asset holdings of the 
poor and vulnerable rather than just their income streams.  It 
is one of the first to be based on more spatially distributed 
remotely-sensed vegetation data, rather than rainfall series 
from a sparse set of fixed point meteorological stations, as the 
IBLI index is derived from satellite-based normalized difference 
vegetation index (NDVI) series that summarize the state of 
rangeland forage availability at high spatiotemporal resolution.  
Finally, IBLI Marsabit was designed to complement a new 
(unconditional) cash transfer program (the Hunger Safety Nets 
Program, HSNP) the government launched in the area and the 
IBLI impact evaluation design explicitly enables identification 
of the independent and synergistic effects of HSNP and IBLI as 
alternative means of addressing the risk and financial constraints 
faced by the poor.  
In the next section we summarize the main principles of 
index-based insurance contracts. In Section three, we start by 
highlighting some of the key characteristics of northern Kenya 
and its economy that make it particularly suitable for risk-
management via index-based insurance contracts, then describe 
the various elements of the IBLI research and development 
agenda. Section four profiles the key processes involved in 
the implementation and sale of IBLI and finally, Section five 
concludes.
Index-based insurance
Like any insurance product, index-based insurance aims to 
compensate clients in the event of a loss. Unlike traditional 
insurance, which makes payouts based on case-by-case 
assessments of individual clients’ loss realizations, index-based 
insurance pays policyholders based on an external indicator that 
triggers payment to all insured clients within a geographically 
defined space. For index insurance to work, there must be a 
suitable indicator variable (the index) that is highly correlated 
with the insured event.  Using a data source that is promptly, 
reliably, and inexpensively available (and that cannot be 
manipulated by either the insurer or the insured), an index 
insurance contract makes the agreed indemnity payment to 
insured beneficiaries whenever the data source indicates that the 
index reaches the “strike point,” or insurance activation level. 
For example, if one is insuring against livestock mortality, then 
rainfall or forage availability may be suitable indicators if drought 
or a shortage of forage, or a combination of the two, often result 
in above-normal livestock mortality. One could then write an 
insurance contract based on some statistically specified function 
of a rainfall or forage indicator to protect against specified levels 
of aggregate livestock losses.  The contract would specify its 
geographical reach, temporal (or seasonal) coverage, the strike 
level, and the relevant premium and payment terms.
An index-based insurance product has significant advantages 
over traditional insurance.  Traditional insurance requires that 
the insurer monitor the activities of their clients and verify the 
truth of their claims.  For relatively small clients in infrastructure-
deficient environments like the northern Kenyan arid and 
semi-arid lands (ASALs), the costs of such monitoring are often 
prohibitive.  With index-based insurance products, all one has 
to do is monitor the index, thereby sharply reducing costs. 
Furthermore, by using an index based on variables that cannot 
be influenced by any insuree’s behavior, index-based insurance 
products overcome the key asymmetric information problems 
that plague traditional insurance contracts: that more (less) risk-
prone individuals will self-select into (out of) the contract and 
that insured individuals have an incentive to take on added risk 
– phenomena known as “adverse selection” and “moral hazard”, 
respectively.
These gains from index-based insurance come at the cost of 
“basis risk”, which refers to the imperfect correlation between 
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an insuree’s potential loss experience and the behavior of the 
underlying index on which the insurance product payout is 
based.  Individuals can suffer losses specific to them but fail to 
receive a payout because the index does not trigger.  On the 
other hand, lucky individuals may receive indemnity payments 
that surpass the value of their losses.  While this problem cannot 
be completely eliminated, we have carefully designed the IBLI 
contract to minimize basis risk and therefore to maximize its 
value to the insured population. 
Economic and social returns to IBLI for the ASAL
In Kenya’s arid and semiarid lands (ASALs), drought is the 
most pervasive hazard, natural or otherwise, encountered 
by households on a widespread level. This is especially true 
for northern Kenya, where more than 3 million pastoralist 
households are regularly hit by severe droughts. In the past 100 
years, northern Kenya recorded 28 major droughts, four of which 
occurred in the last 10 years. For livelihoods that rely solely or 
partly on livestock, the resulting high livestock mortality rate has 
devastating effects, rendering these pastoralists among the most 
vulnerable populations in Kenya. As the consequences of climate 
change unfold, the link between drought risk, vulnerability and 
poverty becomes significantly stronger.
In such an environment, the economic and social returns to 
an effective program that insures pastoral and agro-pastoral 
populations against drought-induced livestock losses can 
be substantial.  To the extent that the likelihood of severe 
herd mortality reduces incentives to build herds, insuring 
livestock against catastrophic loss would address the high risk 
of investment in such environments.  By thus stabilizing asset 
accumulation this should improve incentives for households 
to build their asset base and climb out of poverty, thereby 
enhancing economic growth.
One of the principle negative effects of a risky environment is 
that it depresses the development of financial markets that 
are a critical pillar of economic growth.  Private creditors are 
often hesitant to offer uncollateralized loans particularly when 
borrowers’ capacity to repay is closely tied to risk outcomes.  
In such an environment, financiers might become willing to 
lend if the assets that secure their loans could be insured.  
Livestock insurance, which can be used as collateral, can thereby 
potentially “crowd-in” much-needed credit for enterprises and 
individuals in the region without leaving creditors overexposed.
Finally, because it provides indemnity payments after a shock, 
livestock insurance could help stem the collapse of vulnerable, 
but presently non-poor households, into the ranks of the poor 
following a drought (or related crisis) due to irreversible losses 
from which they do not recover.  This is a particularly salient 
point given the increasing empirical evidence of behavioral 
response consistent with the presence of dynamic poverty traps 
among pastoralists of northern Kenya (Barrett and McPeak, 
2005; Lybbert et al., 2004; McPeak, 2001; Santos and Barrett, 
2006).  Poverty traps manifest in the form of a dynamic herd-
size threshold above which herds accumulate to a high-level 
equilibrium and below which herd sizes naturally diminish to 
a low-level equilibrium below the poverty line.  For those with 
herd sizes slightly above this threshold, protecting them against 
losses that will naturally lead them toward chronic poverty is an 
important priority that IBLI could theoretically fill (Barrett et al., 
2008; Chantarat et al., 2009b).  
IBLI design and implementation challenges
Despite the contractual advantages of an index-based insurance 
product, as well as the potential economic and social benefits, 
four major challenges confront the creation of an IBLI contract 
and ensuring a sustainable market for it:
• High quality data are required to accurately design and price 
insurance contracts and determine when payouts should be 
made;
• Design of an optimal insurance index that to the maximum 
extent possible reduces the risk borne by the target 
population so that the value and potential demand for the 
product are high;
• Effective demand for IBLI insurance among a target clientele 
largely unfamiliar with insurance in general and index-based 
agricultural insurance in particular; and
• Cost-effective ways of delivering IBLI insurance to small and 
medium scale producers in remote locations.
Given the promise of IBLI to manage the considerable 
drought-related mortality risks that pastoral and agro-pastoral 
populations face and the challenges associated with introducing 
a novel and relatively complex product to a remote and 
largely illiterate population, it was necessary to develop a 
comprehensive research and development agenda that would 
incorporate the design of a context-specific IBLI contract, 
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examine the risk profile of the target population, explain the 
contract and coverage terms, elicit willingness-to-pay, and create 
the environment necessary for a successful pilot.  The following 
section highlights some of the key activities undertaken within 
this agenda.
Developing IBLI for northern Kenya
Overview of the livestock economy in Marsabit District
The value of an IBLI contract for underwriting risks depends 
on the role that risk plays within the target economy and how 
amenable it is to indexing.  In other words, is it a risk that is 
largely covariate in nature, impacts a substantial number of the 
insurable population over a sufficiently wide spatial area, and is 
highly correlated to a readily observable and cheaply available 
non-manipulatable variable that can serve as the index?  These 
characteristics, which we sought as a precondition for a suitable 
pilot location, are found in the livestock economy of Marsabit 
District in northern Kenya. 
Northern Kenya’s climate is generally characterized by bimodal 
rainfall with short rains falling from October through December, 
followed by a short dry period from January-February, and 
long rains in March-May, followed by a long dry season from 
June-September. Pastoralists rely on both rains for water 
and pasture for their animals, as well as occasional dryland 
cropping. Pastoralism in the arid and semiarid areas of northern 
Kenya is nomadic in nature, where herders commonly adapt 
to spatiotemporal variability in forage and water availability 
through herd migration. 
Source: McPeak et al. 2010b
Source: McPeak et al. 2010b
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8The NDVI data we use is derived from data collected by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) satellites, and processed by the Global Inventory Monitoring and Modeling Studies 
group (GIMMS) at the National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA). The NOAA-Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR) collects the data used to produce NDVI. Values of NDVI for 
vegetated land generally range from about 0.1 to 0.7, with values greater than 0.5 indicating dense vegetation. 
9Further details about NDVI are available at http://earlywarning.usgs.gov/adds/readme.php?symbol=nd.  
10We present the modeled contract in simplified form and do not delve deeply into the key design issues. For a more detailed technical description and analysis, please see Chantarat et al. (2009a).  
Livestock represent the key source of livelihood across most 
ASAL households.  As Figure 1 shows, when households are 
split across four categories – high and low cash income and 
high and low livestock holdings (where the threshold for high/
low is determined by the median value), only the low-livestock, 
high-cash households obtain less than 50% of their income from 
livestock.
The danger is that livestock face considerable mortality risk, 
rendering pastoralist households vulnerable to herd mortality 
shocks.  Among these, drought is by far the greatest cause of 
mortality (Figure 2) and drought-related deaths largely occur 
during severe shocks, as during the rain failure of 2000 (Figure 
3).  IBLI is designed for precisely these instances of considerable 
loss.  During times of relative normalcy, mortality arises relatively 
randomly due to non-drought related mortality causes such as 
diseases and predators.  Such losses can be self-insured. IBLI is 
designed to cover those more severe shocks that pose a greater 
threat to livelihoods.
Design of the IBLI contract
To design and appropriately price the IBLI contract itself, we had 
to find a measure that is (i) highly correlated with local livestock 
mortality; (ii) reliably and cheaply available for a wide range 
of locations; and, (iii) historically available to allow pricing of 
product.  The Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) 
meets these conditions.  Constructed from data remotely sensed 
from satellites, NDVI is an indicator of the level of photosynthetic 
activity in the vegetation observed in a given location. As 
livestock in pastoral production systems depend almost entirely 
on available forage for nutrition, NDVI serves as a strong 
indicator of the vegetation available for livestock to consume. 
Since the late 1980s, the United States’ NASA and NOAA have 
used AVHRR data8 to produce decadal (10-day) composite NDVI 
images of Africa at a resolution of 8.0 x 8.0 km a day, and have 
built a valuable archive of these data from June 1981 to present, 
which are available in real time and free of charge.9  
While NDVI has properties that make it reliable as the basis for 
an insurable index, it must also have value for the insured.  In 
other words, NDVI data has to predict livestock mortality rates 
reasonably well.  We used household-level livestock mortality 
data collected monthly since 2000 in various communities in 
Kenya’s ASAL districts by the Government of Kenya’s Arid Lands 
Resource Management Project (ALRMP) to statistically estimate 
the relationship between NDVI measures and observed livestock 
mortality.  To improve the contract and minimize the expected 
incidence of basis risk, we used panel data collected by the 
USAID-funded Pastoral Risk Management (PARIMA) Project 
quarterly from 2000 to 2002 (See Chantarat et al., 2009a for 
more details on data and product design).  
Our current contract is based on Marsabit District, the pilot area.  
We combined herd history data to create an optimal insurance 
index defined as the function of the NDVI data that is simple, 
replicable, commercially implementable and highly correlated 
with the herd mortality data so that it provides the maximum 
possible insurance value to the pastoralist population.
The key feature of the contract we designed is a statistical 
predictive relationship between average livestock mortality 
within a specific area and the satellite-based indicator of forage 
availability NDVI.  Equation (1) presents a simplified version 
of the regression model we estimate to generate the key 
relationship underlying the IBLI contract10. The area average 
livestock mortality rate, lsM , can be decomposed into the 
systematic risk associated with the vegetation index and the risk 
driven by other factors:
(1)  	l s l sl sndviXMM E )(
where  	l s l sl sndviXMM E )(  represents various transformations of the average 
NDVI observed over season s in location l. These transformations 
include standardized NDVI that presents deviations from the 
long-term average and also include cumulative standardized 
NDVI summed across various periods across the seasons prior 
to coverage.  These transformations are intended to capture the 
unique dynamics of the pastoral production system whereby the 
nutritional health of livestock is not only dependent on current 
forage conditions but also the state of forage over the past 
couple of seasons. 	M  represents the statistically predicted 
relationship between )( lsndviX and lsM , and 	E  is the 
mean zero, serially uncorrelated idiosyncratic component of area 
average mortality that is not explained by )( lsndviX  – i.e., 
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location-specific basis risk. We predict area average mortality 
from observations of lsndvi , specific to each location l and 
season s, as:
(2)  	)(ˆ lsls ndviXMM 
The response function represented by Equation (2) serves as the 
underlying index for the insurance contract. 
As livestock mortality response to forage can vary due to 
different factors, it was necessary to divide Marsabit District into 
two clusters, each distinguished by its own response function, 
in order to improve precision of contracts. The two distinct 
geographic zones (Figure 4), which we term the Laisamis Cluster 
and the Chalbi Cluster were divided based on statistical cluster 
analysis, which bundles locations with similar characteristics, 
such as distribution of species within a herd, mortality rates and 
variables that may influence the predictive relationship between 
livestock mortality and NDVI. The Chalbi cluster is drier and its 
herds have a higher fraction of camels and smallstock while in 
Laisamis cattle dominate.  
The performance of the contracts can be analyzed by looking 
at how well the predicted mortality index corresponds to the 
actual area-averaged mortality in the target area.  We present 
these results for both clusters and various insurance triggers 
in Table 1.  Predictive relationships for both clusters maintain a 
high probability of correct trigger decisions.  We define a correct 
decision as occurring when the model predicts mortality rates 
above the trigger and actual data shows that indeed mortality 
rates were above the trigger level.  Correct decisions are also 
made when the model fails to trigger and actual mortality also 
did not register above the trigger.  Where errors occur, they are 
quite well distributed between Type 1 (when beyond-strike loss 
is experienced but no payout is triggered) and Type 2 (payout 
is triggered when experienced loss is below the relevant strike) 
errors – the two components of basis risk.  It is clear, however 
that contract performance generally improves the higher the 
strike.  A balance must therefore be made between contracts 
that optimize performance and ones that covers a wider range 
of risk.
With the response function estimated, we then estimate the 
actuarially fair premium rate per season per value of Tropical 
Livestock Unit (TLU) livestock insured for location l in season 
s covering the loss event that the predicted area averaged 
mortality index 
lsMˆ  is beyond the mortality strike of 
*
lM can 
be written as:
(3)                   	  	 	0,ˆ ** llslls MMMaxEMp           
where 	E  is the expectation operator over a distribution of 
NDVI based mortality index. The mortality strike
*
lM is the 
mortality level for location l, additional losses beyond which the 
contract will compensate for.   The simplified pricing equation 
presented in Equation (3) above is the actuarially fair premium 
rate (%) per value of aggregate livestock insured.  Table 2 
reports the actuarially fair premium rates for contracts with 
various strikes across both clusters.  Because the incidence of 
widespread mortality is higher in Chalbi than Laisamis, the fair 
premium rates are likewise higher there. As expected, the lower 
the strike level beyond which indemnity payments are triggered, 
the higher is the premium as compensation is more likely to 
occur.
Table 1: Insurance contract performance
Cluster Strike Correct trigger decision Incorrect decision
Type 1 error Type 2 error
Chalbi 10% 0.71 0.13 0.17
15% 0.81 0.06 0.13
20% 0.88 0.04 0.08
25% 0.85 0.10 0.04
30% 0.94 0.04 0.02
Laisamis 10% 0.80 0.09 0.11
15% 0.88 0.03 0.09
20% 0.84 0.09 0.06
25% 0.81 0.14 0.05
30% 0.84 0.13 0.03
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Uncovering client interest and demand for IBLI
In order to appropriately understand the target clients’ attitudes 
toward risk, to study their demand for insurance and conduct 
ex-ante impact assessments, we conducted in-depth community 
and household-level surveys among pastoralists in five 
communities in Marsabit District (Dirib Gombo, Karare, Logologo, 
Kargi and North Horr) chosen purposively to vary in terms of 
pastoral production system, market access and agroecology.  The 
main objectives of the surveys were to (i) have full understanding 
of pastoralists’ nature of livestock losses, their perceptions 
about risk of livestock loss and climate; (ii) introduce potential 
clients to the concept of IBLI; and (iii) investigate patterns and 
determinants of demand and willingness to pay for IBLI.
After an initial introductory focus group discussion with 
approximately 15-20 community members, we fielded a 
household survey in each location in which 42 households per 
location were randomly drawn using stratified sampling by 
wealth class.  The household survey collected household-level 
information, production data, risk profiles, the history of herd 
dynamics, perceptions about risk of livestock loss and other 
relevant information.
The IBLI experimental game
These households were later brought together to take part in 
an experimental game designed to replicate existing pastoral 
production systems, which we used to illustrate how index 
insurance would work and how it could be beneficial  (Lybbert 
et al., 2010; McPeak et al., 2010a). Experience with other index 
insurance pilots has shown that a carefully designed program 
of extension to appropriately educate potential clients is a 
necessary precondition to both initial uptake and continued 
engagement with insurance (Gine et al., 2007; Sarris et al., 2006). 
A prerequisite to generating demand and ensuring that the risk-
management benefits of insurance effectively serve the client 
is for them to clearly understand the value of insurance and, in 
particular, how an index insurance product works. 
In order to design an extension tool that adequately captures the 
complexities of the IBLI product and relays the key features and 
terms of the contract, we took a cue from the growing field of 
experimental economics.  Experimental games offer a method by 
which complex concepts can be distilled and taught in a relatively 
simple manner, and dynamic decisions or processes can be 
easily repeated during game play to mirror the outcomes and 
elicit the behavioral response that could otherwise take years to 
understand. 
A good experimental game that can impart important insights 
and lessons onto its “players” needs to ensure that the 
simplified, abstract game mirrors the real world (in this case the 
actual features of IBLI contracts and their interaction with the 
pastoral production system) as much as possible.  As such, we 
designed our IBLI educational game to replicate the nonlinear 
herd dynamics that livestock keepers in the rangelands face, 
as well as the basis risk intrinsic to IBLI and state-conditional 
indemnity payments only when an insurance premium was paid 
before the season began.  
Soliciting willingness-to-pay
The games were very well received and in both their responses 
and questions in a sessions conducted after the games it was 
clear that the key intended lessons had been grasped: 
1) One had to pay for insurance within the period of coverage 
to qualify for indemnity payments;
2) If premiums were paid but the strike to activate insurance 
was not attained, you were not entitled to your premiums 
back; 
3) Payments were a function of area average loss and not 
individual loss; and 
4) Loss was determined by forage estimates derived from 
satellite-generated information. 
Nonetheless, while the games are arguably the most effective 
way to educate clients on the workings on an IBLI contract, they 
are also expensive to run and may not be cost-effective on a 
large commercial scale.
Table 2: Annual actuarially fair premiums for selected strike points across premiums
Cluster/Contract Premium Rate (% of insured value)
10% Strike point 15% Strike Point 20% Strike Point 25% Point
Chalbi Cluster 9% 5% 3% 1%
Laisamis Cluster 5% 3% 1% 1%
182
C h a lb i
L a is a m is
 
Table 3 presents the percentage of sampled respondents across 
locations who had a willingness to pay for IBLI at or above the 
quoted prices.  Two prices were quoted, the actuarially fair price 
and the fair price with a 20% loading to account for possible 
mark-up and other business costs that may be associated with 
commercial provision.  On average more than one third of the 
sample indicated a willingness to pay at least 20% above the 
fair price for the 10% strike contract, a figure that jumped to 
almost 70% for a 30% strike contract.  One reason the 30% 
strike contract is likely to be more popular is because it is much 
cheaper.  This also explains the lack of variation between the fair 
and fair + 20% contracts.  At such low costs, an additional 20% is 
often times trivial.  
Commercial contract features and terms - Having established 
a strong potential demand for IBLI at commercially sustainable 
prices what remains is to pilot the product. To launch the IBLI 
contract on the market five key contract parameters must be 
clearly set out: 
1) The geographical area that the contract covers; 
2) The “premium” or the price paid for insurance coverage; 
3) The “strike point,” meaning the index level at which the 
insurance is activated and payouts begin; 
4) The value that will be paid for each livestock unit that is later 
estimated to have been lost; and
5) The length of time for which paid coverage lasts.
Geographical coverage of contract: Marsabit District will be 
covered by the two different response functions previously 
described above (Figure 4). The Chalbi response function 
underlies the Upper Marsabit contract consisting of Maikona 
Figure 4. Chalbi and Laisamis contract 
coverage clusters
Table 3: Percentage of respondents willing to pay at least the stated amount for ILBI by location
Location 10% Strike 30% Strike
Fair Fair +20% Fair Fair +20%
Overall 50% 34% 69% 69%
Dirib Gombo 71% 41% 78% 78%
Kargi 46% 32% 50% 50%
Karare 81% 75% 100% 100%
Logologo 30% 14% 57% 57%
North Horr 35% 22% 71% 71%
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and North Horr divisions, and the Lower Marsabit contract 
consisting of Central, Gadamoji, Laisamis, and Loiyangalani 
divisions is based on the Laisamis response function (Figure 5). 
The boundaries were chosen due to clear agro-ecological and 
pastoral production system differences, as well as differences 
in risk. Upper Marsabit has a higher fraction of camels and 
smallstock in their herds than does Lower Marsabit. While 
the two contract clusters imply two different prices, premium 
payouts will be division-specific.  Therefore, in the Lower 
Marsabit cluster for example, there will be three different 
division-specific livestock mortality predictions for the index 
upon which premium payouts will be determined.
Annual contract premiums and strike point: For the Marsabit 
Pilot launched in January of 2010, the relevant premiums as 
established by the commercial partners are presented in Table 
4. These prices are specified for a contract with a strike point at 
15%, the chosen trigger level. Fifteen percent was chosen after 
a process of negotiation among the commercial and technical 
partners that involved a tradeoff between a lower strike, which 
would provide greater risk coverage but cost more, and a higher 
strike which, while cheaper, covers a lower portion of the risk. 
One can think of the strike point as a deductible.  Individuals will 
cover any losses up to 15% predicted mortality and insurance 
will compensate for any loses above that. The consumer price 
is the amount the clients in the specified coverage area paid 
for.11 The actual market price, however, includes the full costs 
of commercial partner commissions and the relevant taxes. 
The difference is currently being subsidized by donors. The 
expectation is that, as the novelty of the product wears off and 
late-adopters enter the market, increased competition and the 
market, coupled with greater capacity in the industry, will bring 
the actual price down to a consumer price that represents a 30% 
loading on the fair premium on average.
Insurable livestock unit and value of herd: The standard 
livestock types for a pastoral herd will be covered.  These are 
camel, cattle, sheep and goats.  To arrive at a value for the 
insured herd, the four livestock types will be transformed into 
a standard livestock unit known as a Tropical Livestock Unit 
(TLU), where: 1 TLU = 1 cow, 1 TLU = 0.7 camel, 1 TLU = 10 goats 
and 1 TLU = 10 sheep.  Using average prices for livestock across 
Marsabit and discussion with key traders and stakeholders, we 
have arrived at a set price per TLU insured of Ksh 15,000.12 
Upper
Marsabit 
Contract
M aikona
North Horr
 
Lower 
Marsabit 
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C entral and G adam oji
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Figure 5. Contract spatial  
coverage 
Table 4: IBLI premiums for 15% strike contracts in Marsabit
Contract Cluster Consumer Price Total Market Price
Upper Marsabit 5.5% 9.2%
Lower Marsabit 3.25% 5.4%
11Clients do not have to be living in the area for which they purchase coverage. They only have to state that the herd they are insuring largely resides in the coverage area. Nevertheless, for the pilot, clients 
did not have to provide proof of livestock ownership. 
12While in theory clients can simply state their subjective valuation of the herd they want to insure, we opted for a standard price for ease of administration. The standard price was derived as a function of 
household-level livestock sale price data (Chantarat, 2009a).
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Temporal structure of contract: Figure 6 presents the time 
coverage of the IBLI contract being piloted.  The contract is an 
annual one whose coverage spans from March 2010 to February 
2011.  IBLI contracts (and other Index-based Insurance contracts) 
can only be purchased within a specific time window, which in 
this case is in January and February 2010 (and August/September 
2010 for contracts spanning October 2010 to September 2011).  
Contracts must be sold within this time frame as the rainy 
season beginning right after that may give the potential buyer 
information about the likely conditions of the season to come 
that would unfairly affect his purchase decision.  This annual 
contract has two potential payout periods: (i) at the end of the 
long dry season in September and (ii) at the end of the short dry 
season in February.  At these points in time, if the index reads 
greater than 15%, insurance will pay clients.
How does IBLI work?: As an example, let us consider the Gudere 
family in Kargi who purchase 10 tropical livestock units of IBLI 
insurance for the period covering March 2010 to February 2011.  
At Ksh 15,000 per TLU, Gudere’s herd would be valued at Ksh 
150,000 (=15,000 x 10).  As Kargi is located in Lower Marsabit, 
Gudere would pay an annual premium of Ksh 4,875 (which is 
3.25% of Ksh 150,000) to cover his entire herd for the annual 
coverage period.  Put in perspective, this is about the value of 
just over 3 goats to insure 10 cows over the space of a year.
Once Gudere has purchased insurance, he will now wait to see 
if he receives any compensation.  At the end of September, we 
would obtain the 2010 long rain/long dry NDVI data for the 
Laisamis division that Kargi is in and feed those data into the 
Laisamis response function, generating the predicted mortality 
index. Suppose the predicted mortality rate is 13%.  Gudere 
would not receive any compensation. However, let us imagine 
that at the next possible payout period, in February 2011, the 
predicted mortality for Laisamis at that time is 25%. This 25% 
mortality index is then compared to the contractually stipulated 
strike point of 15%. In this example, the Gudere family would 
receive compensation for 10% (=25%-15%) of their covered 
herd of 10 livestock units. They would thus receive a payment 
of KSh 15,000 (= 10% of Ksh 150,000, the insured herd value). 
All the Gudere’s insured neighbors in Laisamis would receive 
compensation at the same predicted rate of 10% of their 
insured herds. Those who bought no insurance would receive no 
indemnity payment.
Launching the IBLI pilot
Critical to the objective of launching a commercially sustainable 
product was convincing commercial partners to take up the 
product and offer it through the market. Through a process 
of broad engagement with potential partners, a tripartite of 
interested parties collaborated with the International Livestock 
Research Institute (ILRI) to launch the pilot in Marsabit. UAP 
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Figure 6. Temporal structure of IBLI contract
Source: Chantarat et al. 2009.
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Insurance Company of Kenya (UAP), re-insured by Swiss Re 
together underwrites the risk while Equity Insurance Agency 
(EIA), provides the agency services taking care of extension, 
publicity and sales.  ILRI and her research partners (Cornell 
University, Syracuse University and the University of California-
Davis) offer the technical support and provide the evaluation and 
impact assessment services.  
The delivery channel
Marsabit is a remote, sparsely populated and relatively 
infrastructure deficient area.  As such, in thinking through 
product implementation, one cannot ignore the hardships 
that may arise in targeting clients, accepting premiums, and 
making indemnity payments within a system that generates 
enough confidence to allow for active market mediation. UAP 
and particularly EIA would need to develop an administrative 
infrastructure that can cost-effectively contract transactions.  
Fortunately, a substantial social protection program, dubbed 
the Hunger Safety Net Program (HSNP) – funded by the UK 
Department for International Development (DfID) – began rolling 
out in four of Kenya’s poorest districts in 2009. Within a year, and 
for the first four-year phase of its ten-year expected duration, 
the HSNP plans to deliver regular cash transfers to 60,000 
households spread across Mandera, Marsabit, Turkana and Wajir. 
This is a huge task for which a well-designed delivery channel 
with a wide network across these regions is required. 
The Financial Sector Deepening Trust (FSD), in conjunction with 
Kenya’s Equity Bank (EIA’s parent firm), has been working on just 
such a delivery channel and had the responsibility of creating the 
necessary Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and 
financial infrastructure needed to support the HSNP program.  
Equity Bank was contracted to open over 150 new Points of 
Sale (PoS) across these regions that will be able to facilitate 
and provide the HSNP cash transfer to recipient households.  
Using new hi-tech portable devices within a sophisticated 
computing system, these PoS devices can be easily configured 
to accept premiums for certain insurance contracts and register 
indemnity payments when necessary.  EIA will use this delivery 
infrastructure to offer IBLI contracts.  Where EIA wants to offer 
the product in Marsabit communities not selected to receive 
HSNP cash transfers, it would be easy to extend the network to 
these areas. 
Preparing to launch
An entirely new product requires several layers of preparation for 
it to be successfully launched into the market.  First, any required 
regulatory authorization must be secured. The partners attained 
regulatory approval to proceed from the Insurance Regulatory 
Agency (IRA) of Kenya. The IRA’s main concern was the question 
of “insurable-risk” whereby the insured party’s covered risk is 
very clear. We argued that one of the key benefits of an index 
insurance product that drastically reduces transactions costs was 
that there was no need for insurance companies to verify actual 
livestock losses because payments were entirely a function of the 
index. As such, we recommended that insurance be sold without 
requiring the agent to verify if the client actually owns all the 
livestock that they intend to insure. While this means there is 
no real way to ensure that the client will indeed face the risk 
that he is insuring against (drought-related livestock mortality), 
the IRA finally agreed with the caveat that they would further 
review the issue should the success of the pilot result in more 
comprehensive scale-out across the country.
The next step was to publicize the product and prepare the 
extension effort.  In an environment such as Marsabit, it is 
critically important to receive blessings from influential members 
of the community.  As such, we called a workshop of key 
stakeholders ranging from Government line ministries and NGOs, 
to local government representatives, community elders and 
traders, to carefully explain the product features to them, the 
pilot strategy and the on-going evaluation efforts.  Many were 
already familiar with the product given the earlier research effort 
in which we had engaged them.
Given the characteristics of the region, publicity is best received 
by word of mouth and our key client engagement strategy was 
through interaction with trained extension agents.  As such, we 
held a weeklong training of close to 20 Master Trainers (MTs) 
selected from among professionals working in relevant capacities 
or previously associated with the IBLI research process.  This was 
followed by another weeklong training, run together with the 
MTs, of Village Insurance Promoters (VIPs) who were recruited 
from the target villages.  In addition to supervising the VIPs, MTs 
were expected to be able to answer any questions relating to 
the product’s features and the implementation process not only 
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After the sales window ended on February 28, the project team 
returned to Marsabit in mid-March and brought together various 
key stakeholders, ranging from a select group of Master Trainers 
and Village Insurance Promoters, some of the clients that had 
purchased insurance, village-level government representatives, 
as well as officials of Government line ministries and heads of 
local NGOs.  The objective was to reflect on the successes and 
failures of the implementation process, gather perceptions 
on the product and solicit information to help improve the 
extension and sales effort for the subsequent sales period.  The 
workshop was held against the backdrop of heavy rains that 
occurred in the first two weeks of March, resulting in vigorous 
vegetation response and reducing the likelihood of an insurance 
payout in September.
The workshop was extremely insightful, generating helpful 
discussion and highlighting both the key opportunities that must 
be tapped and the challenges that need to be addressed.  Some 
of the more important issues raised include:
• A flawed sales process: The major concern, largely voiced 
by the Master Trainers and Village Insurance Promoters, was 
that a failure in the sales delivery system dampened sales 
and left many interested clients frustrated.  As it happened, 
the software needed to allow the PoS terminals to transact 
sales of IBLI was not ready on time and thus sales had to 
be done manually, with agents being driven from town to 
town to carry out the transactions. With the poor roads and 
communications infrastructure in Marsabit District and the 
long distances that had to be covered, this proved to be a 
real challenge. Some towns could be visited only once or 
twice during the six-week sales window, often coming in 
unannounced before the VIPs could rally together interested 
clients. Consequently, there were many clients who 
expressed strong interest but were unable to be served, at 
certain points even getting frustrated and losing confidence 
in the product. Fortunately the software will be ready in time 
from clients but also interested partners and institutions. VIPs 
on the other hand provided the key grassroots extension effort 
directed at potential clients. 
With all this in place, the IBLI product was launched on January 
22, 2010 in a colorful ceremony in Marsabit town.  The launch 
was presided over by the CEO of Equity bank and brought 
together high-ranking officials, including the Minister for 
Livestock and the local Member of Parliament, as well as the 
Secretary General of the Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims 
who came in to endorse the product.  The high-profile event 
generated significant buzz that travelled by word of mouth to 
various corners of the district; the launch also attracted the 
attention of reputable national and international media houses.  
For the next six weeks, until the end of February when the 
selling window closed, the MTs and VIPs fanned out to offer their 
extension services, and sales agents began, for the first time, to 
sell IBLI to clients across Marsabit District.
Sales and lessons learned
Results from the first IBLI sales in Marsabit went beyond most 
expectations.  In the six weeks of sales after the launch, a total of 
1,979 individuals purchased insurance contracts to cover a total 
of 3908 cattle, 15,826 sheep and goats, and 339 camels.  Total 
premiums collected came up to US$ 46,597.  Table 5 presents the 
relevant sales statistics by cluster (Upper and Lower Marsabit).  
By highlighting the promise and potential of IBLI in the area, 
this result has reinvigorated the commercial partners who 
are already beginning to think of scaling-up the pilot beyond 
Marsabit District.  It is instructive to note that underlying the 
high level of sales was an often sub-par implementation effort, 
discussed in some detail below, that was fraught with challenges. 
Indeed, had the sales delivery process gone as planned, we 
estimate that we could have sold, at the very least, twice as 
many contract as we did.
Table 5. IBLI Contract Sales Figures for Jan/Feb 2010
Premium 
rate
Contracts 
sold
Cattle  
no. insured
Sheep/ goats  
no. insured
Camels  
no. insured
Total value of  
insured livestock 
(USD)
Total value of 
collected premiums 
(USD)
Upper 5.5% 556 371 11,081 185 347,620 19,119
Lower 3.25% 1,423 3537 4,745 154 845,460 27,477
Total 1,979 3908 15,826 339 1,193,080 46,597
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for the next selling period in September.  However, as the 
PoS terminals may not completely cover the whole District, 
a clear logistical plan to ensure that all interested clients 
are served in a cost-effective manner will need to be put in 
place.  
• Publicity should be improved: It was noted that, in certain 
places, individuals were not aware of the product and that 
the best way to improve awareness and knowledge of the 
program was by ensuring that the area chief was informed. 
Radio programming on vernacular stations was also 
encouraged. 
• Payout trigger too high: There was also the feeling that a 
15% payout trigger level was too high and that it should 
be lowered to 10% where payments would be made more 
frequently and cover more of the loss. There was no real 
conclusion when it was made clear that a reduced trigger 
level would mean higher prices. However, it is an important 
issue to consider, as relatively minute indemnity payments 
made infrequently may begin to erode confidence in the 
product. 
• Lack of payout may affect demand: Indications, due to 
the heavy rains, that the contract would not payout in 
September left several worried that without a payout 
in the near future, demand for the product would be 
severely affected. While this may be true, there were also 
several among those who had purchased contracts who 
were relieved that there was rain but recognized that, as 
drought was inevitable, IBLI would continue to have value.  
Nevertheless, what the actual impact of continued non-
payout will be remains to be seen. However, it is clear that 
ensuring clients have a solid understanding of how the IBLI 
product works is critical. The extension message needs to be 
tweaked to emphasize the downside risk-protection role that 
IBLI pays.
Conclusion
The effort to design and pilot IBLI as a commercially sustainable 
tool to help the pastoralists of northern Kenya insure themselves 
against drought-related livestock mortality has largely been 
a success.  It was a process that began with the identification 
of the key source of vulnerability plaguing pastoralists and 
the recognition that IBLI may be a promising intervention to 
help manage the main source of risk they face – widespread 
livestock losses due to drought.  What followed was an effort 
to investigate the feasibility of developing an IBLI product.  
Marsabit District, where the first IBLI contracts were sold, 
met all the necessary prerequisites for development: the data 
needed to model IBLI were available, harsh droughts were 
established as the leading cause of livestock mortality in an area 
where livestock formed the backbone of livelihoods, research 
identified the likelihood of demand capable of supporting a 
market mediated product, and the delivery infrastructure for the 
provision of the contracts was already in place.   
The relatively high sales generated from the first sale window 
are a promising sign, but it is still too early to reach a definitive 
verdict and there are several challenges still to surmount.  
Nevertheless the train has left the station and is moving fast.  
Growing interest from both commercial and development 
partners demands that we aim to rapidly scale up the project 
to other ASAL districts in Kenya and investigate the feasibility 
and applicability of IBLI in similar contexts in other countries 
and regions. We do, however, need to firmly ensure that we 
can walk before we run.  A careful effort evaluating the process 
and product and rigorously assessing its impacts across various 
welfare indicators is critical.  To this end a comprehensive 
baseline survey of over 900 households across 16 Marsabit 
communities was undertaken in September and October 2009.  
These households will be revisited annually over three years, 
generating information needed to understand just how well IBLI 
works as a risk-management tool, as well as the indirect effects it 
has on household wealth and welfare. 
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